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4.1 Introduction
The evidence reported and reviewed elsewhere in this volume suggests
that increasing openness to trade is associated with higher growth and that
growth can in turn explain much of the observed reduction in poverty (see
in particular Harrison’s introduction to this volume). A secondary ques-
tion is whether the poor beneﬁt as much as, more than, or less than other
members of society as a result of trade liberalization. The relationship be-
tween trade liberalization and the distribution of income remains a hotly
debated issue even though standard theory in the shape of the two-factor,
two-country Heckscher-Ohlin model provides an unambiguous predic-
tion: trade liberalization will increase the relative price of the abundant fac-
tor, which in the case of developing countries is usually taken to be un-
skilled labor. This in turn should reduce inequality.
As argued elsewhere in this volume, however, the Heckscher-Ohlin spec-
iﬁcation is a drastic simpliﬁcation of a complex phenomenon, and rela-
tively minor steps toward greater realism or a shift in focus toward diﬀer-
ent aspects of trade liberalization complicate matters (Davis and Mishra,
chap. 2 in this volume). To take just one example, Feenstra and Hanson
(1997) focus on a diﬀerent form of “trade”: the transfer of production from
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Branko Milanovic and Lyn Squiredeveloped to developing countries. In their model, the wage gap between
skilled and unskilled workers in developing countries increases, pointing
toward increased inequality. Thus, plausible models can lead to quite dif-
ferent predictions.
Whenever theory leads to diﬀerent predictions, empirical evidence is re-
quired to help us choose among alternatives. The available empirical liter-
ature, however, does not lead easily to robust conclusions. The combina-
tion of a complex phenomenon and data inadequacies renders empirical
work both hazardous and partial. Diﬀerent authors focus on diﬀerent as-
pects of the phenomenon ranging from wage inequality to income in-
equality; they employ diﬀerent speciﬁcations, sometimes relating levels of
openness to levels of inequality and sometimes relating changes in open-
ness to changes in inequality; and they use various alternative deﬁnitions
of key variables, including the measure of openness, with some authors us-
ing quantities (trade volumes) and others using policies (tariﬀ levels). The
end result is that a careful interpretation of the existing literature requires
attention to all these possible points of diﬀerence in the various studies.
The purpose of this paper is to present the results of a new empirical in-
vestigation of the relationship between trade liberalization and inequality,
one that we hope addresses some of the concerns raised above. To this end,
the paper draws on a review of the existing empirical literature to identify
preferred ways of specifying the empirical model. One outcome of our re-
view is that it leads to the use of two large databases on the distribution of
wage income in various forms, sources that have not previously been
tapped for this purpose.
The paper begins in section 4.2 with a review of existing empirical work
in two critical dimensions: domain and speciﬁcation. Domain refers to the
measures of trade liberalization (volumes or policies) and of inequality (in-
comes or wages) under examination. It also refers to the focus of the study:
whether it is a single-country or a multicountry study. Speciﬁcation deals
with the issue of whether variables should be measured in levels or in ﬁrst
diﬀerences. It also encompasses the important issue of interaction between
variables. In section 4.3 we discuss the variables that we use in the empiri-
cal analysis. The estimation is presented in section 4.4 for interoccu-
pational wage inequality and in section 4.5 for interindustrial wage in-
equality.
4.2 Review of the Empirical Literature
As noted in the introduction, the literature contains a diverse collection
of empirical eﬀorts to identify the relationship between trade liberalization
and inequality. This diversity plagues the interpretation of results and com-
parisons across studies, but at the same time it provides a valuable source
of material to guide the empirical speciﬁcation estimated in this paper.
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these, six point to a positive relationship between the chosen measure of
openness and the chosen measure of inequality. Three indicate that open-
ness increases inequality in low-income countries. Five studies ﬁnd no im-
pact on inequality. Only one paper points to declining inequality among
the “globalizing countries” including the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). In addition, two other papers (Free-
man 1995 and Richardson 1995) provide reviews of the then existing em-
pirical literature and conclude that trade liberalization has a positive
(increasing) albeit modest impact on inequality. What is surprising about
this quick summary is that none of the studies indicate declining inequal-
ity in low-income countries, the one region where standard theory predicts
such an outcome. The choice, then, seems to be between no impact and in-
creased inequality.
Two qualiﬁcations are in order, however. First, the results are often quite
fragile: small changes in speciﬁcation or deﬁnition of variables can under-
mine statistical signiﬁcance. And second, each of the ﬁfteen studies focuses
by necessity on only one aspect of the relationship between trade liberal-
ization and equity. In principle, then, these apparently contradictory re-
sults could in fact be perfectly consistent. To explore this further, we ex-
amine the studies in each of two dimensions: domain, or the focus of the
investigation, and speciﬁcation, especially whether estimates are levels on
levels, or changes on changes. At the end of our discussion of each dimen-
sion, we select our preferred option(s) for our subsequent empirical anal-
ysis.
4.2.1 Domain
Openness in the majority of papers is deﬁned in terms of trade volumes.
Only three papers use some indicator of policy to measure openness. And
with respect to inequality, more papers analyze income inequality than
wage inequality, with the latter typically being explored in the context of
single-country studies exclusively in Latin America.
Income inequality in a cross-country sample is the subject of several pa-
pers. An early example is that by Edwards (1997). He regresses the change
in the Gini index between the 1970s and the 1980s on a dummy indicating
whether a country had engaged in trade liberalization as measured by the
average black market premium or the average collected tariﬀ ratio. He
ﬁnds that trade reform did not signiﬁcantly aﬀect inequality. Other authors
arriving at similar results—albeit using diﬀerent speciﬁcations, time pe-
riods, and data—include Londono (2002) and Dollar and Kraay (2001).
Barro (2000), however, ﬁnds that openness, as measured by trade volumes,
is associated with higher levels of inequality in a panel of countries. He
concludes: “Basically, the data reveal a long-term positive association be-
tween the levels of openness and inequality” (p. 5). Other authors, again
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Londono, and Szekely (1999) and Lundberg and Squire (2003) also detect
a link between openness and increased inequality.
Reconciling these results is diﬃcult because they cover diﬀerent coun-
tries and time periods (and could therefore be reﬂecting diﬀerent rela-
tionships) and because they use diﬀerent speciﬁcations and variable deﬁ-
nitions. One possibility that emerges from other work is that country
categorization may be important. Several authors (Ravallion 2002; Mi-
lanovic 2005; Savvides 1998) ﬁnd that their preferred measure of openness
increases inequality in low-income countries. Barro (2000) also ﬁnds the
relationship more pronounced in poorer countries. In Spilimbergo, Lon-
dono, and Szekely (1999, p. 88) openness aﬀects countries diﬀerently de-
pending on their endowments: in capital-rich countries, openness reduces
inequality, while in countries with abundant skilled labor, openness in-
creases inequality. The authors argue that the former eﬀect is driven by re-
duction of capital rents; the latter eﬀect, however, is consistent with
Heckscher-Ohlin.
The mix of countries in aggregate studies may therefore be the crucial
factor leading to diﬀerent results. Either way, this is a signiﬁcant result, for
two reasons. First, it runs counter to the prediction of conventional trade
theory and raises obvious policy concerns. And second, it suggests that
empirical work would beneﬁt from some attempt to interact policy changes
and initial conditions to capture the possibility of diﬀerent eﬀects at diﬀer-
ent levels of development, a point to which we return below.
Wage inequality is addressed by several authors in the context of speciﬁc
Latin American countries. For example, Harrison and Hanson (1999) ex-
amine the extent to which the increase in wage inequality in Mexico was as-
sociated with the 1985 trade reform. They ﬁnd that the reform did play a
part but that other factors, including foreign direct investment, export ori-
entation, and technological change, were also important. Regarding Mex-
ico, Robertson (2000) argues that trade liberalization and “labor ﬂexibi-
lization” led to an erosion of rents in protected industries (which in the case
of Mexico were less skilled) while foreign investments increased demand
for highly skilled labor. The two eﬀects resulted in widening wage distribu-
tion.
Beyer, Rojas, and Vergara (1999) ﬁnd a similar eﬀect of trade reform on
wage inequality in Chile because skill-intensive, resource-based industries
expanded following liberalization. Arbache, Dickerson, and Green (2003)
ﬁnd that following the extensive trade liberalization in Brazil in the 1990s,
average wage in the traded sector fell compared to the nontraded sector
(even after adjusting for education, experience, etc.) and that the only cat-
egory that was spared a decline was the highly educated, because the re-
turns to education went up. They argue that these results are consistent
with the erosion of rents in the traded sector in the wake of liberalization,
146 Branko Milanovic and Lyn Squireand complementarity between skilled labor and new technology brought
in by openness.
Behrman, Birdsall, and Szekely (2003) look at the impact of various
policies (trade, ﬁnancial liberalization, privatization, and tax reform)
jointly or independently on wage diﬀerentials in Latin America during the
last twenty years. This study’s use of policy indicators (developed by the
Inter-American Development Bank) rather than outcomes is very similar to
the approach we shall adopt here. Behrman and coauthors conclude that
more liberal trade regimes did not have an impact on wage diﬀerentials be-
tween diﬀerent education categories. Financial liberalization and high-
technology imports in the context of a liberal trade regime, however, con-
tributed to the rising inequality. They conclude, “it is not increases in trade
but changes in technology that are associated with growing wage gaps”
(p. 30).
These studies suggest two overall conclusions for future empirical work.
First, it is important to allow for each country’s initial conditions, espe-
cially with respect to level of income and the prereform structure of pro-
tection, and the reduction in protection by sector in order to understand
the impact of trade reform. And second, since trade reforms are seldom
undertaken in isolation, allowance has to be made for other reforms. Most
often, trade reforms come together, in a package with labor reforms. Dis-
entangling the two eﬀects—in addition to accounting for the eﬀects of
technological progress that may be nonneutral—is diﬃcult.
Turning to the choice of variables, we select wage inequality rather than
income inequality for both theoretical and empirical reasons. The link be-
tween policy reforms and wage inequality is likely to be much stronger than
the link between policy reforms and inequality in total income. What hap-
pens to total income and its inequality is mediated by a number of other
factors, including the role of social transfers (pension spending or family
beneﬁts), demographics of the population, family formation and mating,
labor force participation, and so on. Since wage inequality is relatively im-
mune to such factors, the link between policy and the distribution of wages
should be much stronger than that between policy and the distribution of
total income, and it should therefore be easier to detect empirically.
Moreover, labor is the main asset owned by the poor whether they are en-
gaged as unskilled labor or informal workers in the urban areas or as land-
less laborers or small farmers in rural areas. The return to labor at low skill
levels is therefore a critical determinant of poverty. Provided that there is
some degree of informal-formal and urban-rural labor mobility, average
wages in occupations or industries employing mainly low-skill or unskilled
labor will reveal what is happening to the returns to the labor of the poor
in general. Any worsening in the distribution of wages is therefore a strong
indicator that the poor, both those in wage employment and those in vari-
ous forms of self-employment, are not beneﬁting from trade liberalization
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cerned. In eﬀect, a worsening in the distribution of wages will be magniﬁed
when it is translated into the distribution of labor returns because of the
large number of low-skill and unskilled workers not receiving a wage for
their labor.
There is also an empirical reason for our choice. Inequality measures of
total income are not available annually; we have inequality statistics for
most countries only for a few years in a decade. The Deininger-Squire data-
base, for example, gives on average an inequality statistic for one out of
every ﬁve possible country/year combinations. In contrast, the two data-
bases on wages that we use—Freeman and Oostendorp (2000) and the
University of Texas Inequality Project database—have annual data for a
large number of countries and years. This should increase the power of our
empirical estimation and tests.
Trade liberalization can also be measured in many diﬀerent ways. The
primary choice is between policies (tariﬀ reductions, elimination of non-
tariﬀ barriers, etc.) and outcomes such as trade volumes that are a conse-
quence of trade policies. Both approaches have been used in the literature.
Most of the studies reviewed here used trade shares as their measure of
globalization. Lundberg and Squire (2003) use the Sachs-Warner index,
which, although linked to policies, has been criticized on the grounds that
it captures more than trade policy. Edwards (1997) uses a variety of policy
measures: average tariﬀ, average quantitative restrictions (QR) coverage,
and average black market premium. Savvides (1998) uses a specially cre-
ated measure of protection covering both tariﬀand nontariﬀbarriers com-
piled from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNC-
TAD) data at the four-digit level of the Customs Cooperation Council
Nomenclature. The measure is only available, however, for 1988. Finally,
those studying wage inequality within a country are often able to make use
of industry-speciﬁc tariﬀ rates and quotas.
All of the various ways of specifying variables representing trade liber-
alization are useful and answer interesting questions. If trade volumes are
chosen, then the study says something about the impact of trade volumes
on inequality. And for some purposes that may be an interesting question.
But, in our view, it does not say much about the impact of policy on in-
equality, primarily because trade volumes are not determined exclusively
by policy. A wide range of factors will inﬂuence a country’s trade volume:
the country’s geography, technology, demand conditions in importing
countries, competitors’ supply conditions, weather, and so on. Even at-
tempts to control for these other factors will inevitably leave a residual that
captures more than trade policies. We suspect that the widespread reliance
on trade volumes in the empirical literature reﬂects the relative ease of ob-
taining data compared with the diﬃculty of achieving the same for trade
policies. Since we are interested primarily in how pro-openness reforms
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squarely in the policymakers’ corner. We attempt to answer the question
that many policymakers naturally formulate when they envisage trade re-
forms: “What will be the eﬀect of liberalization reforms such as tariﬀ re-
duction on wage diﬀerences between various occupations and industries?”
4.2.2 Speciﬁcation
Turning to the econometric speciﬁcation of the relationship to be esti-
mated, we take two points from our review: ﬁrst, although most re-
searchers have regressed levels on levels, we believe that the work under-
taken to date points to the importance of focusing on changes in both the
dependent and the explanatory variables; and second, several studies sug-
gest that the impact of policy change depends on the level of development
and that therefore interactive relationships need to be incorporated.
The speciﬁcation in most studies is a relationship between levels of in-
equality and levels of globalization. These studies generally have more suc-
cess in ﬁnding statistically signiﬁcant results. Thus, the studies that ﬁnd a
negative impact of globalization on inequality rely on regressions run in
levels. For example, Barro (2000) regresses the Gini index on the share of
trade in gross domestic product (GDP). Lundberg and Squire (2003)
regress the Gini index on the Sachs-Warner measure of openness. On the
other hand, the studies that regress changes in inequality on changes in
globalization have a much more diﬃcult time ﬁnding signiﬁcant results.
For example, Edwards (1997) uses the change in inequality between the
1970s and the 1980s as his dependent variable and a dummy indicating
whether a country undertook trade reform as his explanatory variable.
Dollar and Kraay (2001) use the growth in the income of the bottom 20
percent and changes in trade volume. Both sets of authors conclude that
trade reform and/or changes in openness have no impact on inequality.
Interestingly, two papers undertake both levels-on-levels and changes-
on-changes analyses. Milanovic (2005) ﬁnds that openness hurts poorer
deciles in low-income countries when the analysis relates levels to levels,
but he ﬁnds no measurable eﬀect when he switches to changes on changes.
Similarly, Harrison and Hanson (1999) ﬁnd that high industry tariﬀs are
associated with greater wage inequality when they conduct the analysis in
levels but not in changes. This suggests that either there is no relationship
between changes in openness and changes in inequality, or the data are not
suﬃciently ﬁne to capture such a relationship.
This is an important observation because in our view changes-on-
changes regression is the preferred speciﬁcation. Trade liberalization is
presumably a dynamic concept and a continuing one. Regressions of levels
on levels, however, typically attempt to compare stable points of equilib-
rium. Consider this argument. Deﬁne liberalization for present purposes
as trade openness measured by trade policies. Now imagine two countries,
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has literally just implemented its trade liberalization. One would imagine
that resource reallocation, changes in factor prices, and other adjustments
would have played out in the ten years following the reform in the ﬁrst
country, and the distribution of income would have arrived at a new sta-
tionary state. The relationship between policy and inequality could there-
fore be interpreted as an equilibrium. In the other country, however, trade
policy will have changed but the economy, including inequality, will not
have had a chance to adjust. If these two countries appear as two observa-
tions in a cross-country regression of levels on levels, it is very diﬃcult to
interpret the meaning of any results whether statistically signiﬁcant or not.
On the other hand, if the change in policy is related to the change in in-
equality after some common period of time in both countries, then the re-
sults, whatever they may be, are more easily interpreted. With this argu-
ment in mind, we focus our empirical work on variables measured in ﬁrst
diﬀerences. That is, we focus on changes in countries’ policy stances and
changes in inequality outcomes.
A second point that emerges clearly from the review as noted above is
that the impact of liberalization may diﬀer depending on the initial condi-
tions of the liberalizing country. However, in the empirical work this ap-
proach is not always implemented. The implicit assumption is often that
the eﬀects of reforms are the same regardless of the initial level of policy
openness or income. In other words, opening up an entirely closed econ-
omy by one reform point yields the same results as further opening an al-
ready open economy. We shall try to avoid this type of simpliﬁcation by
controlling for the initial level of openness and income and, of course, for
other initial diﬀerences between economies. Similarly, reforms that are
each represented by one policy variable are seen, for econometric conven-
ience, to aﬀect outcomes additively. This is a strong simpliﬁcation: reforms
might often act multiplicatively in that the absence of one type of reform




The ﬁrst of the two large databases we use to derive inequality measures
is that of Occupational Wages around the World (OWW).1 The data cover
the period from 1983 to 1999 and more than 150 countries. The coverage
in all its dimensions, however, is problematic and fragmentary. Although
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1. The OWW database is available at http://www.nber.org/oww/.there are 156 countries in total, each country does not provide data (occu-
pational wages) for every year. The yearly country coverage varies between
48 and 76. Occupations included also vary from country to country. More-
over, for a given country, even when the occupational coverage does pro-
vide the annual data, it is not necessarily uniform for each year.2
Furthermore, it should be noticed that each observation is an observa-
tion on “habitual” countrywide wages for a given occupation. Thus, some
averaging is already built into the data. That, however, need not be a prob-
lem since, for example, the diﬀerences in earnings by skill levels are also
based on averaging. There is, however, a diﬀerence in that the latter are ob-
tained through a statistical analysis that covers a well-deﬁned spectrum of
wage earners (labor force survey) and controls for other relevant factors
(gender, experience), while the International Labour Organization (ILO)
data represent a mish-mash of average “habitual” wages for diﬀerent un-
derlying populations: some countries—for some years—report monthly
wage rates, others report collectively bargained wages, yet others report
hourly wages. At times men and women are combined, and at times only
wages for men are reported. Freeman and Oostendorp (2000) overcome
the problems of data comparability by “calibration,” which is essentially a
process of ﬁnding the adjustment coeﬃcients (based on a regression anal-
ysis) for the data given in a “nonstandard” form, where the standard form
is deﬁned as the most common form being used in the data set—that is,
monthly wages for male workers.3
The great advantage of the database (which incidentally also makes the
calibration possible) is its size: in the Freedman-Oostendorp “summary”
(compendium) of the ILO sources, there are more than 72,000 observa-
tions of average occupational wages.4 For each of the three indexes of inte-
roccupational wage inequality that we calculate (Gini coeﬃcient, standard
deviation, and absolute mean deviation from the median), inequality in-
dexes are calculated only for the country/years that contain more than ﬁf-
teen occupational wages (of the “calibrated” type). After this “ﬁlter” and
a few others (dropping data for a number of small island economies and de-
pendencies), we are left with 680 observations (country/years) covering the
1983–99 period and 118 countries. The average Gini is about 23.8, the me-
dian 21.7, with the standard deviation of about 10. A summary of the data
is given in appendix table 4A.1. These inequality statistics can be regarded,
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2. For example, the United States gives the data on 11 occupations in 1983 and 150 occu-
pations in 1999.
3. They do several such calibrations and show (in an appendix) that the results (inequality
statistics) do not depend on a particular calibration. For our calculations, we have used their
suggested base-wage calibration, denoted xlwu in the OWW database.
4. The Freeman-Oostendorp database is indeed a “summary” of ILO data since the data
on occupational wages have been collected by the ILO since 1924, while the Freeman-
Oostendorp data begin with 1983.according to Freeman and Oostendorp, as indicators of both occupational
wage inequality and skill premium.5
Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of annual changes in the calculated
Gini coeﬃcients (Dginioww) over the 1984–99 period. As we observe, the
distribution is close to being symmetrical and normal, with the mean be-
ing slightly positive (0.17 Gini point) and a zero median.
The second large database of interindustrial wage diﬀerences was cre-
ated by James Galbraith and associates and is known as the University of
Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) database (see Galbraith and Kum 2003).6
The original data come from United Nations Industrial Development Or-
ganization (UNIDO) statistics. The UNIDO statistics provide average
manufacturing pay by industry. The number of industries (which provide
their mean wages) varies between countries and years. On average, there
are twenty-four industries per country/year (with the standard deviation of
about seven). From these average industrial wages for a given country/year,
Galbraith and his associates calculate the Theil index of inequality (vari-
able Theil). The UTIP database covers on average about 90 countries an-
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5. Implicitly, the greater the dispersion of interoccupational wages, the greater the return
to skills.
6. The data are available at http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/.
Fig. 4.1 Distribution of changes in occupational wage inequality (Dginioww; in
percentage points, 1983–99)
Notes: There are 532 Dginioww observations. Changes are expressed in Gini points.nually over the period 1975–99.7 In total, we use 1,651 Theil indexes from
141 countries (see appendix table 4A.2 for details). The average Theil is 5.5,
the median 3.8, and the standard deviation 6.4. In about 10 percent of ob-
servations intersectoral wage diﬀerences are minimal with Theils less than
1. Many of these cases include developed countries (Nordic countries, the
Netherlands) but also Algeria, Cuba, Iran, and (until the mid-1980s)
China.8
Table 4.1 shows simple correlations between diﬀerent inequality mea-
sures from the two databases. We have three inequality statistics from the
OWW database (Gini coeﬃcient, standard deviation, and absolute mean
deviation from the median) and only one from UTIP (Theil coeﬃcient).
Diﬀerent inequality statistics from the OWW database are obviously
strongly correlated (see the ﬁgures shown in boldface). The correlation be-
tween Theil index from UTIP and Gini from the interoccupation inequal-
ity is much less—around 0.4 (see also ﬁgure 4.2). Still, it shows that higher
skill premium is associated with greater intersectoral inequality. The cor-
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7. The data are available at http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/. More recently, the database has ex-
panded to the years prior to 1975. As of January 2004, the UTIP database has almost 3,200
country/year Theils and covers more than 150 countries.
8. It will be noticed that we do not use Gini coeﬃcient here (although we would have liked
to do so for a more direct comparison with the OWW data set). The reason is that the UTIP
database does not provide individual mean industrial wages, which would allow us to calcu-
late diﬀerent inequality measures. The authors provide only the “ﬁnished” statistic—that is,
the Theil index—and not the underlying data. This is not the case with the OWW database,
where individual occupational wages by country/year are available and one can thus calculate
various inequality indexes.
Table 4.1 Simple correlations between various inequality measures and
inequality concepts
OWW average wage by occupation
Absolute mean 
Gini Standard deviation 
coeﬃcient deviation from median
UTIP (average wage by industry) Theil 0.45*** 0.48*** 0.41***
(513) (513) (518)
OWW




Notes: Number of observations given in parentheses. Each country/year represents one data
point; that is, for each country/year, there is one inequality statistic. Null hypothesis: correla-
tion   0. Boldface indicates correlation coeﬃcients calculated between various inequality
measures from the same database.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.relation between the changes in the two measures (which we shall be using
in our regressions) is virtually zero, however.
4.3.2 Import Liberalization Measures
For import liberalization, we use the World Bank measure of unweighted
average tariﬀ (variable Tarf) rate that covers the period from 1980 to 2000,
includes 144 countries, and provides 1,255 observations (country/years) in
total. The list of countries and number of country/years are shown in ap-
pendix table 4A.3. Over this period, the average tariﬀrate (calculated across
the available countries) has been reduced from 28 percent to about 10 per-
cent. Figure 4.3 shows how the distribution of average tariﬀ rates by coun-
tries has shifted leftward, with the median, mean, and the standard devia-
tion all signiﬁcantly less today than in the early and mid-1980s.
The reduction has aﬀected both rich and poor countries. The average
tariﬀrate in poor countries (deﬁned as those with GDP per capita less than
$9,000 at international prices) was reduced from 33 percent to 13 percent;
for the rich countries, the reduction was from 16 to 7 percent. The pattern
of reduction for both poor and rich countries has been very similar to the
one shown in ﬁgure 4.3: not only are average tariﬀ rates less in 2000 than
some twenty years ago, but the diﬀerences between the countries is much
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Fig. 4.2 Interoccupational (Gini) and interindustry (Theil) inequality
Notes: Calculated from 513 observations from 79 countries. Total number of observations is
723 (from 103 countries) for interoccupational inequality and 2,160 (from 141 countries) for
interindustry inequality.smaller too (in other words, the distribution of average tariﬀ rates across
countries is much more compressed now than in 1980).
One problem when trying to link tariﬀliberalization reforms to domestic
outcomes such as wage distribution is that they are seldom undertaken in
isolation. Most frequently, pro-openness trade reforms are accompanied by
other “globalization” policies that may well aﬀect labor market outcomes:
for example, easier direct or portfolio investment by foreign residents or
more liberal regulation of international labor ﬂows. And just as frequently,
trade reforms are accompanied by domestic reforms that impact directly on
labor markets: “ﬂexibilization” of the labor market, changes in the mini-
mum wage legislation, more (or less) liberal severance pay, reform in the
pension regimes, and so on. These accompanying domestic reforms often
concern labor—whether they are “anti” or “pro” labor. Sometimes anti-
labor legislation accompanies openness reforms because it is felt that liber-
alization in the foreign arena can be emptied of content (or cannot produce
the desired results) if there is no improvement in the domestic legislation—
that is, if the latter is deemed too restrictive. Mexico provides one such ex-
ample (Robertson 2000; Hanson and Harrison 1999).
Alternatively, labor policies, at least for a segment of the labor force, can
become more generous if that is the short-term cost the government needs
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Fig. 4.3 Distribution of countries’ average tariﬀ rates in the periods 1980–88 and
1995–2000
Notes: Average tariﬀ rate for a country over a period (1980–88 or 1995–2000) represents one
observation. Number of countries is 106 for the ﬁrst period and 132 for the second.to pay in order to convince trade unions not to wreck the reforms. In that
case, more generous severance pay, low-interest loans to start businesses,
and early retirement schemes can all be used to reduce the resistance to re-
forms and to buy oﬀ potential losers. In addition to labor reforms, there
may also be accompanying ﬁnancial reforms: liberalization of interest
rates, increased competition in the banking sector, and so on. All of this
complicates any attempt to isolate the impact of trade reform on wage in-
equality. We shall therefore try to control for some of these other policies
(labor markets, social transfers).
To measure labor market conditions, we use the Labor Market Data
Base constructed by Martin Rama and Rachel Artecona (see Rama and
Artecona 2002).9 Their database has, at ﬁve-year intervals (year 1975,
1980, etc.), a number of labor-related measures such as social security
contributions (in percentage of gross salary), unemployment rate, replace-
ment rate in case of unemployment, and the like. For our purposes, we fo-
cus on two variables—share of labor force covered by collective agree-
ments, and share of the unionized labor force—that allow us to capture
the power of trade unions and organized labor.
4.4 Trade Liberalization and Occupational Wage Inequality
We look ﬁrst at the level relationship between occupational wage in-
equality and mean tariﬀ rate. Figure 4.4 shows that occupational wage in-
equality (or returns to education) tends to decrease with average income
level of the country (panel A). This is of course what we expect since rich
countries have a greater proportion of skilled labor. Likewise, the average
tariﬀrate tends to be lower in richer countries (see panel B). Finally, returns
to education increase in level of protection (panel C). This last point would
seem to imply that protection is calibrated in such a way as to boost incomes
of more skilled workers.10 However, this relationship may be only apparent
and due to the tendency of poorer countries to have, as we have just seen,
higher average tariﬀ rates. In fact, once we control for the diﬀerence in the
returns to education that is due to income levels, the correlation between re-
turns to education and protection vanishes (panel D). It is no longer statis-
tically signiﬁcant. We can conclude that in a cross-sectional setting, average
level of protection and occupational wage inequality do not display any ob-
vious relationship—once we adjust for the fact that poorer countries tend
to have both higher returns to education and higher levels of protection.
But this does not necessarily imply that there is no relationship between
the changes in mean tariﬀ rate and changes in returns to education. The
156 Branko Milanovic and Lyn Squire
9. The data have been kindly supplied by Martin Rama.
10. Which, by the way, would contradict the general ﬁnding of higher protection for less-
skilled industries (see discussion above).correlation coeﬃcient is –0.10 (see ﬁgure 4.5) and is signiﬁcant at the 10
percent level. It suggests that there may be a weak negative (and uncon-
trolled for other variables) relationship such that a decrease in domestic
protection (i.e., liberalization) is associated with an increase in returns to
education.11
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11. The two variables are run here and further below contemporaneously. However, since
the data on mean tariﬀ rates are often not available for all consecutive years, the Dtarf vari-
able is deﬁned in such a way as to include annual changes wherever available—that is, not only
Tarf (t) – Tarf (t – 1) but also Tarf(t) – Tarf(t – 2) when Tarf(t – 1) is not available. Thus, Dtarf
is partly lagged (about 20 percent of observations refer to changes between years t and t – 2).
Fig. 4.4 Occupational wage inequality, average level of protection, and mean
income: A, occupational wage inequality and level of income; B, average tariﬀ
rate and level of income; C, occupational wage inequality and average tariﬀ rate;
D, occupational wage inequality (controlled for income) and average tariﬀ rateFigure 4.6 shows the distribution of changes in occupational Ginis for
country/years for which we have corresponding data on changes in protec-
tion (that is, ﬁgure 4.6 shows the distribution of Dginioww for our sample,
not for all the observations of Dginioww that we have12). There is, on aver-
age, a tendency for occupational inequality to increase (the mean Gini
change is  0.36, median  0.05), matching the tendency of tariﬀ rates to
go down over the last twenty years (in our sample, the average tariﬀchange
is –1.05 percentage points, the median –0.2). Thus, there is some prima fa-
cie evidence that decreases in protection and increases in occupational
wage inequality may be related.
We look further at this relationship by breaking down changes in returns
to education (Dginioww) across average protection changes (table 4.2).
There is some evidence that deeper cuts in protection are associated with
greater increases in occupational inequality. For example, when tariﬀ pro-
tection goes down by more than 10 percentage points, occupational Gini
increases on average by 1.45 points. When the reduction in protection is
less (between 0 and 5 percentage points), the increase in wage inequality is
158 Branko Milanovic and Lyn Squire
Fig. 4.5 Relationship between change in mean tariﬀ (Dtarf) and change in occupa-
tion wage inequality (Dginioww)
Note: The regression coeﬃcient remains negative and signiﬁcant if outliers—that is, obser-
vations such that Dtarf   –25—are eliminated.
12. The shape of the two distributions, though, is almost exactly the same. The number of
cases, however, is quite diﬀerent. Our sample contains only 268 observations, while there is a
total of 532 observations of changes in occupational inequality.also smaller ( 0.75 Gini points). This relationship is not very strong and
uniform, though. The change in Gini is, on average, positive even when av-
erage tariﬀ rate goes up (by less than 10 percentage points). This in turn
suggests that other factors must be at play too. Furthermore, in a number
of cases where there was no change in mean tariﬀ rate, average (and me-
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Fig. 4.6 Distribution of changes in occupation inequality (when data on both occu-
pational inequality and tariﬀ changes are available)
Table 4.2 Relationship between occupational wage inequality and protection
(average tariﬀ rate)
Mean change  Standard 
in Dginioww  deviation  No. of 
Change in average tariﬀ rate (Gini points) (Gini points) observations
Greater than –10 points 
(in absolute amounts)  1.45 4.06 10
Between –5 and –10 points  1.77 5.65 11
Between 0 and –5 points  0.75 3.55 137
Zero –0.79 4.50 70
Between 0 and  5 points  0.43 3.91 34
Between  5 and  10 points  0.68 1.15 3
Greater than  10 points –0.73 3.78 2
Total  0.36 4.00 268dian) wage inequality tended to go down. On balance, we conclude that,
while there is some evidence that import liberalization is associated with
increasing occupational wage inequality, this is unlikely to be the only fac-
tor that matters.
We next split the sample into rich and poor countries (table 4.3). We take
$9,000 (in purchasing power parity, or PPP, at 1995 prices) as the cutoﬀpoint.
This means that in 1980 about three-quarters of all countries in the world are
regarded as poor (the proportion is about 70 percent in 2000). Since the data
for the rich countries are, on average, more frequently available than for the
poor, the cutoﬀ point neatly splits our sample into about two halves.
The table illustrates that the same regularity applies to both poor and rich
countries: decreases in protection are associated with higher wage inequal-
ity, but so are increases in protection (although the magnitudes are sub-
stantially lower). It is mostly when there is no change in mean tariﬀrate that
we ﬁnd shrinking occupational wage distribution. In eﬀect, out of 122 cases
when occupational inequality goes down, about one-third (39) involve situ-
ations with no change in mean tariﬀrate. Poor countries display in all cases
(decrease, no change, or increase in protection) greater variability in out-
comes. This is illustrated in ﬁgure 4.7, where we look at changes in occupa-
tional Gini when protection is reduced. The strongly spiked density func-
tion for the rich countries (dashed line) shows that reduced protection is
accompanied by relatively small and very similar changes in rich countries’
Ginis; in contrast, in poor countries, Gini changes (solid line) are much
more spread out. The hypothesis of equality of the two distributions is
soundly rejected (the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is signiﬁcant at less than
0.1 percent). This suggests that while average Dginioww for poor countries
may, in response to liberalization, increase more than in rich countries (see
table 4.3), the variability of outcomes will also be much greater and thus
other variables (and possible measurement error) may play a more impor-
tant part in explaining changes in wage inequality.
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Table 4.3 Relationship between interoccupational wage inequality and level of protection
(average tariﬀ rate) in poor and rich countries
Poor countries Rich countries
Change in  Mean change  Standard  Mean change  Standard 
average  in Dginioww deviation  No. of  in Dginioww  deviation  No. of 
tariﬀ rate (Gini points) (Gini points) observations (Gini points) (Gini points) observations
Decrease  1.31 4.63 77  0.44 2.56 82
No change –2.71 6.64 18 –0.13 3.30 52
Increase  0.29 4.21 30  0.71 1.01 9
Total  0.49 5.02 125  0.25 2.80 143
Note: Poor countries are deﬁned as those with GDP per capita less than $9,000 at international 1995
prices; rich countries are those above that threshold.In ﬁgure 4.8we therefore focus on poor countries. We look at the change
in their occupational wage Gini when tariﬀ protection goes up or down.
There are some notable diﬀerences: the “down” (solid) line both is thicker
in the range Dginioww  0 and has a much longer right-end tail. Thus, not
only is the average Gini change greater when protection is lowered than
when it is increased (as we know from table 4.3), but the distribution of
Gini changes looks diﬀerent.13 There are many more instances of large in-
creases in occupational wage inequality when protection is reduced than
when protection is raised.
We now want to investigate how this simple relationship will hold when
subjected to a more rigorous analysis. To do this, we estimate the following
equation for the change in interoccupation ( IneqO):
 IneqO   fct( average tariﬀ, labor market conditions, income level)
or
 IneqO   fct( t, s, y)
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Fig. 4.7 Distribution of Dginioww in poor and rich countries when tariﬀ protection
goes down
Notes: Number of observations: 77 for poor countries, 82 for rich countries. Deﬁnition of
poor and rich countries given in table 4.3 notes. Poor countries are shown by the solid line,
rich countries by a dashed line.
13. However, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test cannot reject the hypothesis that the two dis-
tributions are the same (it is signiﬁcant at p level is 0.22). The equality of means is rejected at
the 10 percent level.A word about the estimation procedure. One might wish to allow
changes in average protection level to aﬀect inequality not only contem-
poraneously but through several time periods (introducing this as a lagged
protection on the right-hand side). However, in that case our number of ob-
servations—whose low number is already an obstacle to better estima-
tion—drops precipitously and the quality of results deteriorates. We thus
assume that one or two years (to the extent that Dtarf also includes some
two-year lagged observations) are a suﬃcient period of time for changes
in protection to work their way through wage distribution. Endogeneity
is unlikely in levels, and particularly so in a ﬁrst-diﬀerence formulation as
here, since change in interoccupational inequality is not likely to have
much to do with change in protection. We therefore do not use instru-
ments.14 Furthermore, the use of ﬁrst diﬀerences implies that idiosyncratic
country eﬀects are included.15
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Fig. 4.8 Distribution of changes in interoccupational Gini in poor countries when
protection goes up or down
Notes: “Down,” denoted by the solid line, indicates the situation when mean tariﬀ rate is re-
duced; “up,” denoted by the dashed line, showed the situation when the mean tariﬀ rate is in-
creased.
14. It is also diﬃcult to ﬁnd reasonable and workable instruments. We tried initial tariﬀ
level, on the assumption that reduction in tariﬀs bears some proportion to their initial levels,
but the results were disappointing.
15. Behrman, Birdsall, and Szakely (2003) have the same formulation as here but present
also the ﬁrst-diﬀerence formulation of policy changes, or in other words the diﬀerence-of-
diﬀerences formulation (with distributed lags over seven periods on the right-hand side).
Their ﬁrst-diﬀerence in levels formulation (table 2) is the same as ours.Table 4.4 gives the results of the regressions for interoccupational wage
inequality. We begin with a very parsimonious formulation where change
in interoccupational inequality (Dginioww) is explained by change in av-
erage tariﬀ rate (Dtarf) and income. None of the variables is found signif-
icant at the 5 percent level; however, Dtarf is negative and signiﬁcant at the
10 percent level. The situation changes when we introduce the interaction
term between the change in average tariﬀ rate and level of income, and
trade union membership or percentage of workers covered by collective
bargaining agreements. Now, decrease in protection is strongly pro-
inequality, with a 1 point decrease in average tariﬀ rate associated with 5.7
percent annual increase in interoccupational inequality.
This pro-inequality eﬀect, however, is reduced the richer the country (be-
cause of the positively signed interaction eﬀect; see regression 3), and even
for the very poor countries is less than it appears at ﬁrst sight. Thus, in a
very poor country with an income of PPP$1,000, a 1 point decrease in the
average tariﬀ rate will be associated with a Gini increase of only 1 percent.
Around PPP$5,000 (using regression 3) the eﬀect reverses and trade liber-
alization begins to be associated with a decrease in interoccupational in-
equality. For example, at the year 2000 mean value of lnGDP per capita
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Table 4.4 Explaining interoccupational inequality, 1984–99 (%; dependent variable:
annual change in Gini)
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
 tariﬀ –0.118 –1.490 –5.707
(0.097) (0.033)∗∗ (0.009)∗∗
Ln (GDP per capita) –0.060 0.448 0.456
(0.816) (0.236) (0.320)
 tariﬀ   ln (GDP per capita) 0.168 0.688
(0.057) (0.008)∗∗
Trade union members as % of  0.002
labor force (TUMMBR) (0.920)
Percentage of workers covered by  –0.002
collective bargaining (TUCVGE) (0.855)
 Tarf   TUMMBR 0.001
(0.915)
 Tarf   TUCVGE –0.012
(0.197)
Constant 0.651 –4.221 –4.132
0.780 (0.205) (0.331)
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.02 0.06
F value (p) 1.6 1.7 2
(0.19) (0.15) (0.1)
No. of observations 233 176 79
Note: Levels of signiﬁcance, p values, given in parentheses.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at less than the 5 percent level.(8.4), the eﬀect of the interaction term is stronger than the eﬀect of change
in tariﬀ rate alone; in consequence, pro-openness reforms will be associ-
ated with a decline in measured interoccupational inequality in richer
economies. Finally, note that the fact that labor market conditions are not
statistically signiﬁcant suggests that labor market conditions do not aﬀect
the change in the skill premium, while the fact that income is not signiﬁ-
cant in any formulation is consistent with industry-based (rather than skill-
based) bargaining.
The results seem to provide some weak evidence that reduction in aver-
age tariﬀ rate contributes to interoccupational wage inequality in poor
countries, although the statistical properties of the regressions (most no-
tably R2) are not strong and the number of observations that we ultimately
have to make the regressions is small (79 versus more than 500 observa-
tions on changes in interoccupational inequality and more than 1,000 ob-
servations on changes in average tariﬀ rates). Therefore we have to take
these results with a strong dose of caution.
4.5 Trade Liberalization and Interindustrial Wage Inequality
In ﬁgure 4.9 we inspect the relationship between interindustry wage in-
equality and several relevant variables (all in levels). Panel A shows that
when a greater percentage of the labor force participates in collective
bargaining,interindustrial wage diﬀerences are less. Panel B shows that in-
terindustry wage diﬀerences increase as average tariﬀ rate goes up. Now,
low tariﬀrates are found—as we have seen before—more frequently in rich
than in poor countries. So are high levels of unionization (collective bar-
gaining). Thus, the two seem to be associated (panel C). This ﬁnding im-
plies that some of the positive relationship between the average tariﬀ rate
and interindustry inequality from panel B may be due to the presence of
high unionization. In other words, the upward slope detected in panel B
may be due not to the existence of a real relationship between tariﬀ rates
and interindustry inequality but to the fact that countries with low tariﬀs
also display high unionization—with the latter driving interindustry wage
inequality down.
When we check for it, however, we ﬁnd that this is not the case. As panel
D shows, once we control for collective bargaining, the relationship be-
tween interindustry wage inequality and average level of tariﬀrates remains
positive—in fact, it even becomes sharper. Protection thus indeed seems to
drive interindustry wage diﬀerences up. We do a further check to make sure
that the relationship is not due, in part, to a change in the sample.16 This is
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16. This happens because we have data on tariﬀrates and interindustry inequality for many
more countries than is the case with collective bargaining. Thus, once we control for collec-
tive bargaining, the sample shrinks from 757 observations, as in panel B, to 286 observations
in panel D.A B
C D
E F
Fig. 4.9 Interindustry wage inequality, average level of protection, and unionism:
A, interindustry wage inequality and collective bargaining; B, average tariﬀ rate and
interindustry wage inequality; C, collective bargaining and average tariﬀ rate; D,
interindustry wage inequality (controlled for collective bargaining) and average tariﬀ
rate; E, interindustry wage inequality (controlled for collective bargaining and level
of income) and average tariﬀ rate; F, change in average tariﬀ rate and change in
interindustry wage inequalitynot the case. When we run the relationship between the average tariﬀ rate
and interindustry wage diﬀerences (as in panel B) across the sample of
country/years in panel D, the results do not change (graph not displayed
here). Moreover, even after we control for bothcollective bargaining and in-
come level,17 the positive relationship between average tariﬀ rates and in-
terindustry wage diﬀerences remains (ﬁgure 4.9, panel E).
But the relationship between levels may not necessarily be indicative of
the relationship between changes. And in eﬀect, inspection of ﬁgure 4.9
(panel F) does show that there is a mild negative relationship between
changes in average tariﬀs and changes in the Theil index of interindustry
inequality. In table 4.5 we look at whether this relationship holds for poor
and rich countries. We easily notice that for rich countries a decrease in
protection is associated with an increase in interindustry wage inequality;
and the reverse is true for the increase in protection. This in turn indicates
that the protected sectors tended to be sectors with lower average wage
(that is, less skilled). An increase in protection is associated with lower
interindustry wage diﬀerences, implying again that higher tariﬀs will tend
to protect sectors with lower average wage (presumably less skilled too).
The same pattern, on average, holds for poor countries, although there the
average changes are much less clear and the standard deviation much
greater. Yet the fact that the same pattern is observable in poor countries
as in rich countries (decreased protection associated with increased in-
terindustry wage diﬀerences) would also tend to support the view that in
poor countries too low-wage or lower-skill sectors tend to beneﬁt from
protection.
Figure 4.10 shows the change in interindustry Theil when protection is
reduced. In rich countries, the eﬀect does not vary much between the coun-
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17. Since income level and interindustry inequality are negatively correlated.
Table 4.5 Relationship between interindustry wage inequality and level of protection (average
tariﬀ rate) in poor and rich countries
Poor countries Rich countries
Change in  Mean change  Standard  Mean change  Standard 
average  in Theil  deviation  No. of  in Theil  deviation  No. of 
tariﬀ rate (Theil points) (Theil points) observations (Theil points) (Theil points) observations
Decrease  0.02 2.56 219  0.15 0.85 137
No change  0.13 2.49 44  0.05 0.60 72
Increase –0.08 2.00 113 –0.32 3.41 23
Total –0.01 2.39 376  0.07 1.29 232
Note: Poor countries are deﬁned as those with GDP per capita less than $9,000 at international 1995
prices; rich countries are those above that threshold.tries and is bunched around zero with a longer right-end tail (which ex-
plains the positive sign of the average). For the poor countries, both right-
and left-end tails are approximately equally long and the distribution is
ﬂatter.
The equation that we estimate for the change in interindustry inequality
( IneqI) can be written as
 IneqI    0    1 (change in average tariﬀ)    2 (labor market conditions)
   3 (change in labor market conditions)    4 (income level).
Table 4.6presents the results for interindustry wage inequality. The ﬁrst,
minimal, formulation shows that none of the variables is signiﬁcant. In the
second formulation, where we introduce the same two interaction terms as
before (trade reform and income, and trade reform and union member-
ship), the eﬀect of change in protection on interindustry wage inequality
becomes signiﬁcant and negative. In other words, reduction in protection
is associated with greater interindustry inequality: each percentage point
of reduction in protection is associated with a 1.7 Theil point increase in
interindustry inequality. This implies that as liberalization dissipates the
rents from protection, the impact on the distribution of wages works, in rel-
ative terms, against those industries that engage more low-skill and un-
skilled workers. Since such workers will be drawn disproportionately from
the ranks of the poor, the implication is that the poor who are engaged in
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Fig. 4.10 Charge in interindustry Theil when average protection level goes down
Note: Deﬁnition of poor and rich countries given in table 4.3 notes.wage employment beneﬁt less from liberalization than their richer coun-
terparts. Furthermore, provided there is at least some urban-rural and for-
mal-informal labor mobility, the conclusion extends to the poor engaged in
nonwage activities.
This eﬀect, however, is less, or is overturned, at higher income levels (as
the interaction term between income per capita and average tariﬀ rate
has a positive sign). At the median level of (ln) GDP per capita of the
countries included in the sample (9.75), the interaction eﬀect is greater
than the direct eﬀect of reform. We would thus expect to observe, at the
median level of income and above, a decline in observed interindustry in-
equality even if proliberalization reforms alone tend to increase inequal-
ity between the industries. More exactly, the turning point would occur
around the world median income, where (in the year 2000) we ﬁnd coun-
tries such as Morocco, Ecuador, and Indonesia. For countries poorer
than these we would observe trade reforms increasing interindustry in-
equality; for richer countries, we would observe a decrease in interindus-
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Table 4.6 Explaining interindustry inequality, 1976–99 (%; dependent variable:
annual change in Theil)
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
 tariﬀ 0.001 –1.731 –2.207
(0.947) (0)∗∗ (0)∗∗
Social expenditures as % of GDP 1.891 1.097 –2.487
(0.08) (0.558) (0.21)
Ln (GDP per capita) 0.148 0.409
(0.288) (0.004)∗∗
 Tarf   ln (GDP per capita) 0.211 0.247
(0)∗∗ (0)∗∗
Trade union members as % of labor force  –0.006
(TUMMBR) (0.268)
 tariﬀ   TUMMBR –0.005
(0.003)∗∗
Number of ILO conventions signed 0.007
(0.006)∗∗
 tariﬀ   number of ILO conventions  –0.002
signed (0.044)∗∗
Constant –0.119 –1.224 –3.879
(0.296) (0.307) (0.002)∗∗
Adjusted R2 0.0047 0.1232 0.127
F value (p) 1.56 4.98 5.91
(0.2118) (0.0001)∗∗ (0)∗∗
No. of observations 241 171 205
Note: Levels of signiﬁcance, p values, given in parentheses.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at less than the 5 percent level.try wage inequality. Similarly to what we found for interoccupational in-
equality, the eﬀects are stronger and less ambiguous for poor than rich
countries.
Reduction of the average tariﬀ rate will tend to contribute to interindus-
try inequality more in countries with higher trade union density (see the in-
teraction variable in regression 2). This suggests that union power is able to
either limit tariﬀ reduction for heavily unionized industries or introduce
other, oﬀsetting measures that protect their wages in some other way. It
also suggests that union power tends to be concentrated in the higher-skill
industries, thereby exacerbating the impact on wage inequality. The same
result is observed in regression 3, where we replace trade union member-
ship with the number of ILO conventions as the measure of union power.
4.6 Conclusions
The empirical results provide weak support for the hypothesis that a re-
duction of tariﬀs tends to be associated with an increase in interoccupa-
tional wage inequality (i.e., education premium) and somewhat stronger
support that reduction in tariﬀs is associated with an increase in wage in-
equality between industries. The latter eﬀect will be particularly strong in
countries with a high density of trade unions. The implication is that the
poor beneﬁt less than the rich from liberalization but that their relative po-
sition could be improved by simultaneously taking measures to limit trade
union power. Average country income plays an important role, though.
Through its interaction with change in average tariﬀs, it oﬀsets the eﬀects
of tariﬀ reduction alone so that at income levels above the world median
(that is, GDP per capita higher than PPP$4,000 in 1995 international
prices) the net eﬀect reverses both for interoccupational and interindustry
inequality.
Our results are obtained from the data covering approximately a
twenty-year period from 1980 to 2000. The data come from three large
and relatively recent databases of occupational inequality (OWW), inter-
industrial inequality (UTIP) and tariﬀrates (World Bank data). Although
all three databases are rich in terms of the number of observations and do
represent a major improvement in data availability, a user cannot escape
the impression that there is still a nonnegligible noise in the data, perhaps
not so much because the data supplied by diﬀerent countries and in diﬀer-
ent periods are wrong but because the coverage of sectors and occupa-
tions and the deﬁnitions of wages are uneven and vary not only between
countries but within countries as well. Thus, the data issues still represent
an important obstacle to our ability to draw stronger conclusions regard-
ing the eﬀect of import liberalization on wage inequality in a cross-
sectional setting.
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Gini of interoccupational wages
Country Mean Standard deviation No. of observations
Algeria 0.1492 0.0305 8
Angola 0.3787 0.1196 3
Argentina 0.3545 0.1718 3
Australia 0.1543 0.0315 14
Austria 0.1852 0.0212 17
Azerbaijan 0.5310 0.0292 4
Bangladesh 0.2757 0.0537 9
Barbados 0.2283 0.0205 12
Belarus 0.1232 0.0058 5
Belgium 0.0900 0.0092 16
Belize 0.3173 0.0226 12
Benin 0.3863 0.0327 5
Bolivia 0.3843 0.0378 11
Botswana 0.2297 0.0032 2
Brazil 0.2348 0.0000 1
Bulgaria 0.1611 0.0000 1
Burkina Faso 0.3305 0.1400 8
Burundi 0.4175 0.0325 8
Cambodia 0.3751 0.1494 7
Cameroon 0.3866 0.0908 7
Canada 0.1341 0.0099 3
Cape Verde 0.2430 0.0001 2
Chad 0.5411 0.0548 4
Chile 0.3496 0.0053 3
China 0.1509 0.0371 10
Colombia 0.3649 0.0626 2
Zaire or Congo, Democratic Republic 0.4401 0.0000 1
Costa Rica 0.1315 0.0856 3
Côte d’Ivoire 0.3648 0.0854 4
Croatia 0.1930 0.0000 1
Cuba 0.1621 0.0121 6
Cyprus 0.2550 0.0143 16
Czech Republic 0.1339 0.0227 7
Denmark 0.1217 0.0199 10
Djibouti 0.3321 0.0000 1
Estonia 0.2191 0.0145 4
Ethiopia 0.3533 0.0000 1
Fiji 0.3099 0.0198 4
Finland 0.1343 0.0167 14
Gabon 0.3768 0.0562 5
Germany 0.2110 0.0101 17
Ghana 0.3607 0.0000 1
Honduras 0.3637 0.0316 9
Hong Kong 0.2078 0.0403 16
Hungary 0.2217 0.0378 6
Iceland 0.0972 0.0115 2
India 0.3247 0.1436 13
Iran, Islamic Republic of 0.1434 0.0000 1
Ireland 0.1913 0.0014 2
Italy 0.1498 0.0228 12
Japan 0.1995 0.0107 15
AppendixTable 4A.1 (continued)
Gini of interoccupational wages
Country Mean Standard deviation No. of observations
Korea, Republic of 0.1979 0.0798 10
Kyrgyz Republic 0.3011 0.0153 4
Latvia 0.2558 0.0175 3
Lithuania 0.2328 0.0000 1
Luxembourg 0.1557 0.0000 1
Madagascar 0.1643 0.0536 2
Malawi 0.4522 0.0501 6
Mali 0.3167 0.0000 1
Mauritius 0.3060 0.0172 16
Mexico 0.0616 0.0602 8
Moldova 0.2055 0.0282 5
Mozambique 0.3055 0.0000 1
Netherlands, The 0.1164 0.0080 7
New Zealand 0.2060 0.0145 7
Nicaragua 0.3685 0.0263 6
Niger 0.3754 0.0000 1
Nigeria 0.3616 0.0570 6
Norway 0.1049 0.0242 16
Papua New Guinea 0.3164 0.0048 2
Peru 0.3525 0.0574 10
Philippines, The 0.0974 0.0357 9
Poland 0.1731 0.0446 2
Portugal 0.1398 0.0884 13
Puerto Rico 0.2071 0.0447 13
Romania 0.2139 0.0646 12
Russian Federation 0.2968 0.1173 8
Senegal 0.2644 0.0000 1
Seychelles 0.2593 0.0557 6
Sierra Leone 0.3099 0.0325 8
Singapore 0.3086 0.0199 15
Slovak Republic 0.1490 0.0149 5
Slovenia 0.2078 0.0160 4
South Africa 0.0982 0.0000 1
Sri Lanka 0.2299 0.0426 12
Sudan 0.2917 0.1540 6
Suriname 0.2336 0.0160 4
Swaziland 0.2911 0.0398 2
Sweden 0.1250 0.0349 9
Thailand 0.3057 0.0416 5
Togo 0.3372 0.0678 5
Trinidad 0.2502 0.0235 7
Tunisia 0.2143 0.1523 6
Turkey 0.1805 0.0489 4
Uganda 0.4810 0.0000 1
Ukraine 0.3049 0.0247 3
United Kingdom 0.1660 0.0170 14
United States 0.2097 0.0306 14
Uruguay 0.2578 0.0279 7
Venezuela 0.2622 0.0233 6
Yugoslavia 0.1760 0.0233 10
Zambia 0.3263 0.0569 7
Total 0.2370 0.1082 680
Note: Variable is xlwu from OWW.Table 4A.2 Summary of data from University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP)
Theil index of interindustrial wage diﬀerences
Country Mean Standard deviation No. of observations
Albania 0.0736 0.1213 8
Algeria 0.0144 0.0156 15
Angola 0.3115 0.1041 2
Argentina 0.0512 0.0102 11
Armenia 0.2128 0.1351 5
Australia 0.0110 0.0036 23
Austria 0.0189 0.0065 25
Azerbaijan 0.0385 0.0238 5
Bahamas 0.0987 0.0191 3
Bahrain 0.4035 0.0000 1
Bangladesh 0.0349 0.0196 18
Barbados 0.0584 0.0172 23
Belgium 0.0167 0.0009 18
Belice 0.1059 0.0097 2
Benin 0.0744 0.0141 7
Bolivia 0.0711 0.0317 25
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.0305 0.0124 2
Botswana 0.0585 0.0153 15
Brazil 0.0776 0.0097 5
Bulgaria 0.0250 0.0300 24
Burkina Faso 0.0328 0.0123 9
Burundi 0.0744 0.0297 13
Cameroon 0.1508 0.0907 20
Canada 0.0199 0.0039 25
Cape Verde 0.0052 0.0038 2
Central African Republic 0.0652 0.0279 17
Chile 0.0657 0.0193 25
China 0.0029 0.0010 7
Colombia 0.0393 0.0055 25
Congo, Republic 0.1144 0.0231 8
Costa Rica 0.0398 0.0188 15
Côte d’Ivoire 0.0737 0.0092 13
Croatia 0.0210 0.0103 11
Cuba 0.0046 0.0009 13
Cyprus 0.0363 0.0086 25
Czech Republic 0.0078 0.0049 9
Denmark 0.0066 0.0010 24
Dominican Republic 0.0792 0.0137 11
Ecuador 0.0495 0.0255 25
Egypt 0.0387 0.0228 25
El Salvador 0.0496 0.0349 17
Equatoria 0.0892 0.0178 2
Equatorial Guinea 0.0301 0.0084 9
Fiji 0.0512 0.0311 21
Finland 0.0107 0.0013 25
France 0.0160 0.0015 17
Gabon 0.1191 0.0410 7
Gambia, The 0.0374 0.0112 8
Germany 0.0108 0.0003 18Table 4A.2 (continued)
Theil index of interindustrial wage diﬀerences
Country Mean Standard deviation No. of observations
Ghana 0.1277 0.0363 16
Greece 0.0383 0.0125 25
Guatemala 0.1058 0.0826 21
Haiti 0.0458 0.0084 14
Honduras 0.0712 0.0321 16
Hong Kong 0.0112 0.0065 25
Hungary 0.0188 0.0186 25
Iceland 0.0435 0.0324 22
India 0.0838 0.0100 20
Indonesia 0.0751 0.0205 19
Iran, Islamic Republic of 0.0211 0.0205 18
Iraq 0.0244 0.0118 15
Ireland 0.0311 0.0185 24
Israel 0.0579 0.0144 22
Italy 0.0164 0.0049 24
Jamaica 0.1816 0.1185 15
Japan 0.0355 0.0172 25
Jordan 0.0779 0.0226 23
Kenya 0.0748 0.0143 24
Korea, Republic of 0.0151 0.0059 25
Kuwait 0.2466 0.1247 23
Kyrgyz Republic 0.0851 0.0236 6
Latvia 0.0087 0.0093 6
Lesotho 0.1055 0.0621 7
Libya 0.0324 0.0373 6
Lithuania 0.0713 0.0522 5
Luxembourg 0.0140 0.0034 20
Macedonia 0.0432 0.0225 10
Madagascar 0.0310 0.0182 14
Malawi 0.1128 0.0499 21
Malaysia 0.0313 0.0073 25
Malta 0.0110 0.0035 22
Mauritania 0.1845 0.0583 2
Mauritius 0.0750 0.0245 25
Mexico 0.0290 0.0099 25
Moldova 0.0318 0.0364 9
Mongolia 0.4423 0.4006 6
Morocco 0.0810 0.0145 24
Mozambique 0.1752 0.1233 7
Namibia 0.0314 0.0000 1
Nepal 0.0681 0.0284 9
Netherlands, The 0.0094 0.0025 25
New Zealand 0.0213 0.0150 22
Nicaragua 0.0205 0.0059 11
Nigeria 0.0390 0.0186 14
Norway 0.0095 0.0011 24
Oman 0.1121 0.0118 6
Pakistan 0.0544 0.0124 18
(continued)Table 4A.2 (continued)
Theil index of interindustrial wage diﬀerences
Country Mean Standard deviation No. of observations
Panama 0.0669 0.0222 23
Papua New Guinea 0.0990 0.0309 15
Paraguay 0.0133 0.0000 1
Peru 0.0830 0.0351 12
Philippines, The 0.0655 0.0155 23
Poland 0.0158 0.0201 25
Portugal 0.0320 0.0064 15
Puerto Rico 0.0818 0.0398 15
Qatar 0.4041 0.0914 8
Romania 0.0103 0.0048 5
Russian Federation 0.0581 0.0090 6
Rwanda 0.0393 0.0092 6
Saudi Arabia 0.1847 0.0000 1
Senegal 0.0433 0.0299 23
Seychelles 0.0075 0.0036 11
Sierra Leone 0.1876 0.1344 2
Singapore 0.0434 0.0130 25
Slovak Republic 0.0163 0.0056 6
Slovenia 0.0165 0.0067 12
Somalia 0.0569 0.0258 6
South Africa 0.0616 0.0071 25
Spain 0.0287 0.0074 25
Sri Lanka 0.0526 0.0130 16
Suriname 0.0570 0.0221 19
Swaziland 0.0993 0.0456 20
Sweden 0.0077 0.0097 25
Syrian Arab Republic 0.0548 0.0566 24
Taiwan, China 0.0155 0.0031 23
Tanzania 0.0630 0.0263 13
Thailand 0.0945 0.0350 13
Togo 0.1050 0.0534 10
Trinidad 0.1579 0.0884 19
Tunisia 0.0896 0.0524 13
Turkey 0.0471 0.0189 24
Uganda 0.1739 0.1034 6
Ukraine 0.0347 0.0261 9
United Kingdom 0.0162 0.0022 25
United States 0.0312 0.0128 25
Uruguay 0.0481 0.0147 23
Venezuela 0.0484 0.0261 22
Yemen, Republic of 0.0670 0.0902 12
Yugoslavia 0.0847 0.0290 5
Zambia 0.0772 0.0147 6
Zimbabwe 0.0544 0.0298 24
Total 0.0548 0.0645 2,160Table 4A.3 Summary of unweighted average tariﬀ rates from World Bank data
Average unweighted tariﬀ rate
Country Mean Standard deviation No. of observations
Albania 17.00 0.00 1
Algeria 25.72 6.73 10
Argentina 18.33 8.05 16
Australia 8.17 3.37 11
Austria 7.05 1.34 11
Bahamas 31.37 1.37 3
Bahrain 5.20 2.63 6
Bangladesh 52.84 33.40 14
Barbados 16.02 4.11 6
Belarus 12.63 0.35 3
Belgium 7.05 1.34 11
Belize 14.66 4.86 5
Benin 33.75 14.30 11
Bolivia 12.58 4.20 16
Botswana 20.55 13.36 2
Brazil 31.89 16.33 20
Bulgaria 16.08 1.88 5
Burkina Faso 32.39 13.28 7
Burundi 29.80 14.94 4
Cambodia 35.00 0.00 1
Cameroon 21.77 5.83 7
Canada 6.74 2.08 9
Cape Verde 22.05 2.90 2
Central African Republic 21.80 6.81 4
Chad 15.75 0.07 2
Chile 14.75 6.57 16
China 33.48 11.59 12
Colombia 20.83 13.42 16
Zaire or Congo, Democratic Republic 23.66 4.76 8
Congo, Republic 19.72 7.44 5
Costa Rica 12.63 5.12 11
Côte d’Ivoire 24.85 3.54 18
Cuba 14.72 7.39 6
Cyprus 11.60 2.50 9
Czech Republic 6.14 1.03 11
Denmark 7.05 1.34 11
Dominican Republic 12.90 4.39 7
Ecuador 17.08 10.70 12
Egypt, Arab Republic of 34.79 8.81 10
El Salvador 11.86 5.83 11
Estonia 0.55 1.25 6
Ethiopia 30.30 1.62 5
Fiji 12.40 0.00 1
Finland 7.05 1.34 11
France 7.05 1.34 11
Gabon 20.16 0.77 5
(continued)Table 4A.3 (continued)
Average unweighted tariﬀ rate
Country Mean Standard deviation No. of observations
Gambia, The 13.55 0.07 2
Germany 7.05 1.34 11
Ghana 20.59 8.71 16
Greece 7.05 1.34 11
Guatemala 11.80 4.92 9
Guinea 21.14 24.54 7
Guyana 17.44 4.50 5
Haiti 16.43 9.79 3
Honduras 8.88 1.01 4
Hong Kong 0.00 0.00 21
Hungary 14.42 4.77 13
Iceland 5.97 2.83 10
India 56.49 25.21 14
Indonesia 20.73 9.12 13
Iran, Islamic Republic of 15.43 9.12 3
Ireland 7.05 1.34 11
Israel 7.78 0.74 9
Italy 7.05 1.34 11
Jamaica 16.10 4.47 13
Japan 6.08 0.62 12
Jordan 16.32 3.18 16
Kenya 32.25 10.18 15
Korea, Republic of 15.55 5.20 15
Kuwait 3.90 0.29 4
Latvia 5.23 0.67 4
Lebanon 13.13 5.89 4
Lesotho 17.40 0.00 1
Lithuania 4.14 0.38 5
Luxembourg 7.05 1.34 11
Madagascar 6.73 0.69 7
Malawi 19.71 4.69 16
Malaysia 12.59 2.94 13
Mali 15.66 2.50 5
Malta 7.54 0.96 5
Mauritania 22.42 6.38 10
Mauritius 31.02 6.88 13
Mexico 16.28 5.41 18
Mongolia 8.20 0.00 1
Morocco 28.15 8.34 17
Mozambique 15.74 1.25 5
Namibia 24.40 0.00 1
Nepal 17.73 4.27 9
Netherlands, The 7.05 1.34 11
New Zealand 6.99 3.67 8
Nicaragua 11.02 6.64 10
Niger 18.30 0.00 1
Nigeria 30.14 5.25 16
Norway 4.88 1.22 9Table 4A.3 (continued)
Average unweighted tariﬀ rate
Country Mean Standard deviation No. of observations
Oman 4.12 1.58 9
Pakistan 60.37 14.50 18
Panama 9.96 1.70 5
Papua New Guinea 17.06 5.43 5
Peru 26.48 13.34 19
Philippines, The 23.96 8.1 21
Poland 12.90 3.37 12
Portugal 7.05 1.34 11
Qatar 3.75 1.37 4
Romania 14.20 4.38 7
Russian Federation 11.24 2.48 5
Rwanda 34.53 5.69 4
Samoa 9.00 0.00 1
Saudi Arabia 9.58 4.36 12
Senegal 13.10 1.78 8
Sierra Leone 29.82 8.31 6
Singapore 0.30 0.16 15
Slovak Republic 7.10 0.91 5
Slovenia 11.00 0.69 3
Somalia 29.67 5.98 3
South Africa 11.86 6.43 13
Spain 7.05 1.34 11
Sri Lanka 24.52 8.09 13
Sudan 35.90 21.05 5
Suriname 24.82 10.15 5
Swaziland 15.10 0.00 1
Sweden 7.05 1.34 11
Switzerland 1.59 2.19 8
Syrian Arab Republic 20.57 13.34 6
Taiwan, China 17.94 9.31 13
Tanzania 25.58 5.03 14
Thailand 30.72 10.83 11
Togo 15.25 2.95 4
Trinidad 18.33 1.06 6
Tunisia 27.55 2.47 16
Turkey 21.26 9.32 12
Uganda 16.87 6.89 7
Ukraine 9.83 0.67 3
United Kingdom 7.05 1.34 11
United States 5.93 0.69 12
Uruguay 21.27 11.95 16
Venezuela 19.59 8.32 15
Vietnam 13.50 2.03 4
Yemen, Republic of 20.73 4.94 3
Yugoslavia 11.84 0.09 5
Zambia 20.17 7.85 9
Zimbabwe 16.39 6.23 11
Total 17.65 14.12 1,255References
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This chapter tackles a broad but topical subject—the cross-country empiri-
cal relationship between trade liberalization and within-country wage in-
equality, particularly in developing countries. This relationship, and hence
the subject of this paper, is somewhat open ended because there is no strong
theoretical result that inﬂuences our prior belief about what the relation-
ship should be.
One could use the Stolper-Samuelson theorem to suggest that abundant
factors of production should beneﬁt from trade liberalization, but the
mapping between this theorem and the messy complexity of developing
countries is problematic, to say the least.
This chapter uses two measure of wage (not income) inequality, one relat-
ing to occupational wages and the other relating to industry wages. These
inequality measures are related to a direct measure of a country’s average
tariﬀ (not “openness” as measured by trade volumes and commonly em-
ployed in other studies).
The authors ﬁnd weak evidence that a reduction in the average tariﬀ
rate is associated with higher interoccupational wage inequality in poor
countries and somewhat strong evidence of an association with greater
interindustry wage inequality. Although the authors are suitably cau-
tious in interpreting their results, I would reinforce this caution. At one
point, the authors write that a tariﬀ reduction “contributes to” increased
wage inequality. Since establishing a strong causal relationship between
the two measures was not the primary object of the paper, I think “asso-
ciation” is a better characterization of the ﬁndings. Many factors drive
wage inequality, and tariﬀ policy is simply one (a measurable one) among
many.
In addition, if there are diﬃculties in attributing changes in inequality
within a country over a given time period to a particular policy measure,
these diﬃculties are aggravated when considering the cross-country evi-
dence. (The United States experienced growing wage inequality in the
1980s, and yet the average tariﬀ did not change at all during the decade.)
At the same time, the results—their general tendency as well as their
weakness—do not come as too much of a surprise. As Gordon Hanson’s
paper (chap. 10 in this volume) points out, six studies of six diﬀerent coun-
tries all found the same general results—that greater openness leads to
greater income/wage inequality. Thus, it appears that country studies have
uncovered an empirical regularity.
This regularity, however, is itself a bit of a paradox. Given the Stolper-
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of Economic Research.Samuelson theorem, which is drilled into the minds of every international
economist, we would expect to see the skill premium fall for skilled work-
ers in developing countries with trade liberalization. But perhaps someone
should inform those workers that the skill premium increases with global-
ization. This is because Mayda and Rodrik (2005) examine surveys of pro-
and antitrade views around the world and ﬁnd that, in developing coun-
tries, higher levels of education are associated with antitrade views, con-
sistent with Stolper-Samuelson. Yet, ironically, the evidence indicates that
those with higher levels of education are precisely those beneﬁtting from
more trade.
Several broader points deserve mention as well.
• Sometimes I think we are missing the big picture. In low-income coun-
tries, about 60 percent of labor force is in agriculture; most of the
rural poor are in agriculture. Yet our data sets usually cover just man-
ufacturing or industry. I think if we are interested in inequality in
developing countries, the urban-rural inequality or agriculture-
nonagriculture wage gap is much more important than wage inequality
within manufacturing (which could be a small part of the story). By fo-
cusing exclusively on manufacturing, we might be missing a big chunk
of the economy and a big part of intranational wage inequality.
• A paper by Shang-Jin Wei and Yi Wu (2001) gets at this by measuring
the urban-rural wage diﬀerential for 100 or so Chinese cities (urban
areas and adjacent rural counties) over the period 1988–93. The cen-
tral ﬁnding is that cities that experience a greater degree of openness
in trade also tend to demonstrate a greater decline in urban-rural in-
come inequality. Thus, globalization has helped to reduce, rather than
increase, the urban-rural income inequality. What they suggest is that
this pattern in the data suggests that inferences based solely on China’s
national aggregate ﬁgures (overall openness and overall inequality)
can be misleading. What I would suggest is that raising rural, agricul-
tural incomes is a key part of reducing inequality, and trade reforms
(agricultural or land policy liberalization) may promote this process.
Traditionally, trade policies have been strongly antiagrarian in devel-
oping countries.
To conclude, the literature on globalization and income inequality in-
cludes several country case studies. This paper attempts a cross-country
examination of the relationship between tariﬀpolicy and inequality, and in
some sense it conﬁrms what we have learned from the country studies. Yet
because these ﬁndings, for developing countries, conﬂict with the basic
Stolper-Samuelson theorem prediction, there is a paradox waiting for
more discussion and analysis in future work.
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